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The Ethnic War Waged by the Wehrmacht in Eastern Europe 
1939-1942
While the ethnic war waged in Eastern Europe during World War II 
was originally thought to be solely conducted by the German S.S. 
of the Nazi Party, the involvement of the German regular army 
(Wehrmacht) is revealed to be more significant than previously 
understood. Through careful scrutiny of photographic evidence, 
the author takes an alternative look at the Wehrmacht’s relation-
ship to Nazi leadership and the S.S., as well as its involvement in 
some of the most brutal episodes of ethnic warfare in World War II.
By Zackary Biro
“ A Portrait, a Drawing, and a Photograph” 
by Jessica Bandy
 By the middle of  the twentieth century Europe was certainly not a stranger to war. Euro-pean nation states had been engaged in warfare for centu-ries, and the First World War 
in the second decade of  the twentieth century 
saw killing on a scale never before realized. De-
spite these realities World War II brought with it 
a new kind of  warfare on a massive scale. For the 
first time in European history, ethnic minorities 
and undesirables became targets of  systematic 
violence and murder in a new age of  total war. 
As the perpetuators of  the murder of  millions 
of  European Jews and socially marginalized 
people, the National Socialist Party of  Germany 
enforced these policies of  ethnic total war. For 
the majority of  the second half  of  the twentieth 
century, historians considered the Wehrmacht, 
Germany’s armed forces from 1935 to 1945, to 
be free from the responsibility for the genocide. 
A certain image of  “clean hands” became the 
common perception of  the German people and 
the Wehrmacht in the post-World War II era. 
Most people have perceived the Wehrmacht as 
passive participants in the S.S.’s murdering of  Eu-
ropean Jews. It was assumed that the Wehrmacht 
officers and soldiers carried out orders without 
reflecting a sense of  ideological agreement for 
the actions they were committing, and only 
passively participated in the murders by stay-
ing out of  the way of  the S.S. In light of  recent 
evidence, particularly from the German World 
War II exhibition War of  Extermination: The Crimes 
of  the Wehrmacht, 1941-1944, historians have been 
rethinking the influence of  the Wehrmacht in the 
murder of  Jews in Russia. 
Recent historians looking at the evidence 
are divided as to how passively or actively the 
Wehrmacht participated in these murders. 
Historians such as Wolfram Wette, a professor 
of  modern history at Albert-Ludwigs-University, 
and Stephen Fritz, a professor of  history at 
East Tennessee State University, believe in the 
Wehrmacht’s voluntary participation in the bru-
talization and unwarranted murder of  Eastern 
Europeans. Wette and Fritz see the Wehrmacht 
as an organization that took the Nazi idea of  
the ethnic inferiority of  Eastern Europeans and 
Jews to heart. Other historians, like Richard 
Evans, a professor of  history at the University 
of  Cambridge, see the Wehrmacht as a passive 
player in the murders. It seems convenient to 
place the actions of  the Wehrmacht into one of  
these two camps. However, the evidence shows 
that the Wehrmacht played an active role in the 
ethnic war in Eastern Europe while only the 
senior officer corps of  the Wehrmacht embraced 
the Nazi ideas of  ethnic hierarchy. During the 
first years of  the war on the Eastern front, the 
Wehrmacht senior officer corps exhibited be-
havior that displayed a willingness to exterminate 
ethnic and political enemies of  the Third Reich, 
but individual examples within the Wehrmacht’s 
junior officer corps also display a passive attitude 
towards the murder of  Eastern Europeans. 
Among Nazi Germany’s many acts of  ag-
gression in World War II were the invasions 
of  Poland in September 1939 and the Soviet 
Union in June 1941. Photographic evidence 
has arisen that documents war crimes commit-
ted by the Wehrmacht during the invasion of  
Poland in 1939. The first photograph depicts 
the execution of  approximately three hundred 
Polish prisoners of  war by the Wehrmacht’s 
15th Motorized Infantry Regiment in Ciepielow, 
Poland on September 9, 1939. The photograph 
depicts several Polish prisoners of  war after the 
Wehrmacht placed them in a trench and shot 
them (see Figure 1).1 Another photograph of  the 
event shows the careful planning and organiza-
tion taken by the Wehrmacht in the execution of  
these prisoners of  war.2 The actions taken by the 
Wehrmacht against people classified as prison-
ers of  war blatantly violated the Hague Regula-
tions of  Warfare. The Hague Regulations were 
conceived after a series of  conferences held in 
1899 and 1907, and covered many topics includ-
ing the proper treatment of  prisoners of  war. 
These regulations were recognized by over forty 
nations, including Germany. In fact, the Service 
Manual of  the German Wehrmacht in World 
War II contained the regulations of  land warfare 
established at the Hague Conferences. The 
Hague Regulations directly deal with the correct 
treatment of  prisoners of  war. Article 4 of  the 
Regulations, Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of  War on Land, says that “prisoners of  war are 
in the power of  the hostile Government, but not 
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of  the individuals or corps who captured them. 
They must be humanely treated. All their person-
al belongings, except arms, horses, and military 
papers remain their property.”3 The photograph 
shows that the Wehrmacht executions of  Polish 
prisoners of  war were clear violations of  these 
international regulations. In comparison, the 
Wehrmacht’s treatment of  British and American 
prisoners of  war on the Western front was quite 
different. The Wehrmacht placed British and 
American prisoners of  war into camps where 
they were mistreated. Unlike the Polish prisoners 
of  war, however, the Americans and British were 
not systematically murdered.4
The invasions of  Poland and the Soviet 
Union were characterized by the brutal destruc-
tion of  armies in the field of  battle. These 
countries also became the site of  a type of  total 
war that the Germans exercised on a new level. 
Nazi Germany conducted a war “directed not 
only against another army, but against parts of  
the civilian population as well.”5 The war in the 
east became a war of  systematic annihilation for 
Germany. Jews and Russian political partisans 
became the targets of  German military person-
nel and were killed or forced into labor camps. 
Despite what Wolfram Wette calls the “legend 
of  the clean hands” of  the Wehrmacht, recent 
evidence brought to the foreground of  the 
discussion points to the Wehrmacht as a prime 
player in acts of  genocide in Poland and Russia. 
Most prominent is the evidence provided by the 
photo and document exhibition entitled Crimes 
of  the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of  a War of  
Annihilation 1941-1944.
This photo exhibition first debuted in Ger-
many during the mid-1990s, and it helped dispel 
some of  the myths surrounding the Wehrmacht 
and the legend of  their “clean hands” with 
regards to their involvement in the acts of  geno-
cide against eastern Europeans and Jews. Among 
the various photos and documents in the exhibit 
are numerous photos of  groups of  Wehrmacht 
officers and soldiers engaging in the execution of  
Russian Jews and political partisans. The first of  
these photographs comes from a collection of  
photographs that depicts public executions in the 
city of  Minsk on October 26, 1941. Officers of  
the 707th Infantry Division of  the Wehrmacht 
carried out the executions. The executed were 
eight men and four women who were killed for 
being alleged Russian political partisans. These 
men and women were in fact members of  a 
Russian resistance group that housed wounded 
Russian soldiers. The men and women were 
combat in the town Kraljevo. The fighting lasted 
several days and the Wehrmacht took citizens of  
the town hostage in an attempt to force the Serbs 
to surrender. When the resistance fighters con-
tinued their attack, the Wehrmacht responded by 
shooting 300 of  the Serbian villagers. After the 
fighting ceased in Kraljevo, the Wehrmacht mur-
dered between four thousand and five thousand 
male civilians in a nearby rail car factory.8 The 
photographs taken at various stages of  the mass 
shooting are evidence of  the killings organized by 
the Wehrmacht. Here the photographs depict the 
deliberate killing of  civilians who were not neces-
sarily Serbian partisan freedom fighters. These 
civilians were shot in an empty rail car factory not 
because they were guilty of  a crime, but because 
the Wehrmacht saw Serbs as enemies of  Nazi 
Germany (see Figure 3).9
The German Claus Hansman documented 
a Wehrmacht-initiated execution of  Russian 
political partisans in the city of  Kharkov in 
modern Ukraine:
The first human package . . . is carried outside. 
The limbs are tightly bound . . . a cloth covers 
his face. The hemp neckband is placed around 
thousand Hungarian Jews out of  Hungary. The 
Hungarian soldiers forced the Jews across the 
border into the city of  Kamenez-Podolsk in the 
Ukraine, which was under control of  the Weh-
rmacht at the time. The Wehrmacht was unable 
to house or feed the several thousand Hungar-
ian Jews, so Major Hans Georg Schmidt von 
Altenstadt and other members of  the local Weh-
rmacht leadership held a meeting to decide the 
fate of  the Jews on August 25. Friedrich Jaekeln, 
commander of  the Higher S.S. and Police in 
Russia South, told Altenstadt that he hoped the 
“liquidation of  these Jews would be carried out 
by September 1, 1941.”11 Jaekeln’s statement 
was merely a suggestion since the Wehrmacht 
had no orders to kill civilians or Jews. The S.S. 
also did not have the authority to issue any such 
orders to the Wehrmacht. Altenstadt decided 
that the removal of  the Jews would be necessary 
even though he had no obligation to execute 
them. Over the course of  the next four days, the 
Wehrmacht in Kamenez-Podolsk shot the entire 
group of  Hungarian Jews. Not only were the 
Hungarian Jews executed but all the Jews in the 
local area were murdered as well. The total num-
ber of  Jews executed by the Wehrmacht in the 
city of  Kamenez-Podolsk was around 23,600.12 
The photographs of  the event show the organi-
zation of  the Jews into lines and groups so that 
members of  the Wehrmacht could systematically 
murder them.13
It should not be assumed that the Wehrmacht 
executed 23,600 Jews because of  an order given 
by the S.S. commander Friedrich Jeckeln. In fact 
the S.S. Einsatzgruppen and Security Service 
commandoes were given explicit control and 
responsibility for “carrying out measures with 
respect for the civilian population.”14 In short, 
the S.S. was designated as being responsible for 
the extermination of  unwanted groups within 
the civilian population. Moreover, Wette says that 
while direct and specific orders were drawn up 
that called for the cooperation between the Weh-
rmacht and the S.S., the same orders gave the S.S. 
“sole responsibility for carrying out their mis-
sion.”15 Major Hans Georg Schmidt von Alten-
stadt and the Wehrmacht in Kamenez-Podolsk 
were not responding to any order given to them 
to execute the 23,600 Jews. The Wehrmacht took 
it upon themselves to commit the executions. 
Wehrmacht. The writings of  lower level mem-
bers of  the Wehrmacht show a lack of  hatred 
and motivation to murder the ethnic enemies of  
Nazi Germany. Before the invasions of  Russia in 
1941 and Poland in 1939 members of  the Weh-
rmacht were already showing a conflict of  inter-
est between the Nazi political ideas of  ethnic hi-
erarchy and their own convictions. Some soldiers 
of  the Wehrmacht, like Albert Bastian, found it 
difficult to reconcile Nazi ideas of  ethnic hierar-
chy with older German stances of  toleration. “I 
was in despair. Although my father opposed my 
teacher . . . I respected my teacher. And here was 
my father, a friend of  Jews. I just couldn’t figure 
These civilians were shot in an empty rail car 
factory not because they were guilty of a 
crime. They were killed because the Wehrmacht 
saw Serbs as enemies of Nazi Germany.
Junior officers and noncommissioned officers  
of the Wehrmacht did not embrace the sense 
of racial superiority that the Nazi leadership 
tried to instill in them. 
paraded through the streets of  Minsk before 
they were hanged wearing signs that indicated 
they had fired at German soldiers.6 The photo-
graphs of  the event show the alleged partisans 
being marched through the streets before one 
of  them was hanged (see Figure 2).7 These two 
photos demonstrate that the Wehrmacht soldiers 
were not only present at these executions but 
that they were the individuals who organized and 
carried them out. 
The photo exhibition also provides more pho-
tographs that document the systematic killing of  
Eastern Europeans by the Wehrmacht. On Octo-
ber 13, 1941 Serbian resistance fighters engaged 
the 717th Infantry Division of  the Wehrmacht in 
his neck . . . he is put on the balustrade and 
the blindfold is removed from his eyes. For 
an instant you see glaring eyeballs . . . then he 
wearily closes his eyelids, almost relaxed, never 
to open them again. He now slides slowly 
downward, his weight pulls the noose tight, his 
muscles begin their hopeless battle. The body 
works mightily, twitches, and within the fetters 
a bit of  life struggles to its end . . . Each one 
bears a placard on his chest proclaiming his 
crime . . . Partisans and just punishment.10
The Wehrmacht was guilty of  the murder of  
Jews in Eastern Europe as well as ethnic Serbs. 
In July, 1941 Hungarian forces fighting in coop-
eration with the German military forced several 
These instances of  murder and genocide 
demonstrate that the Wehrmacht assumed a 
very active role in the ethnic violence directed 
against Eastern Europeans and Jews. In doing 
so, the senior officer corps of  the Wehrmacht 
overstepped the German high command’s 
established boundaries and roles that made the 
S.S. responsible for carrying out the executions. 
The Wehrmacht also violated the Hague Regula-
tions in their treatment of  prisoners of  war and 
civilians. The participation of  the Wehrmacht in 
the execution of  groups of  Eastern Europeans is 
undeniable based on the photographic evidence. 
Now the question of  what led the Wehrmacht 
to overstep their bounds must be answered. The 
orders given to the Wehrmacht were simply to 
assist the S.S. by giving them “marching orders, 
food, and shelter.”16 The high Nazi leadership 
never required the Wehrmacht to participate in 
the execution of  unwanted groups of  Eastern 
Europeans, and so the overzealous actions of  the 
Wehrmacht must be accounted for, whether the 
culprits were high ranking or not.
The motivation for the acts of  genocide com-
mitted by the Wehrmacht cannot be found in 
the junior officer corps or the lower ranks of  the 
it out.”17 Helmut Schmidt was another soldier in 
the Wehrmacht who never showed any inclina-
tions towards wanting to execute the Nazi Party’s 
ideas of  ethnic cleansing. Helmut wrote that he 
“had no real ambition as far as the military was 
concerned . . . Then the war started. As young as 
I was, I only hoped that the episode wouldn’t last 
long.”18 Another junior officer, Hans Herwarth 
von Bittenfeld in the Wehrmacht reflected on 
what it meant to be part of  the Wehrmacht: “My 
oath of  loyalty was not a concern to me. I swore 
an oath to Germany. And I had the distinct 
feeling that Hitler had already broken his oath 
several times by then. I sensed that Hitler was a 
menace to Germany.”19
This evidence from Wehrmacht soldiers 
seems to run contrary to the conclusions of  
Richard Evans. In his book The Third Reich at 
War, Evans argues that the Nazi ideology and 
their policies of  ethnic violence took root in 
the junior officer corps of  the Wehrmacht. 
Evans says that “the intermingling of  Nazism 
with a more traditional kind of  nationalism was 
strongest amongst the youngest and most junior 
troops.”20 Evans argues that the emerging group 
of  young officers and young soldiers in the 
Figure 1
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late 1930s and the early 1940s were extremely 
impressionable. Evans thinks that junior Weh-
rmacht officers easily accepted Nazi ideology, 
which allowed them to commit acts of  genocide 
in Russia. The previous testimony from the 
noncommissioned officers and junior officers 
of  the Wehrmacht does not seem to follow the 
pattern of  behavior among Wehrmacht junior 
officers that was described by Evans. Members 
of  the Wehrmacht’s junior officer corps, like 
Hans Herwarth von Bittenfeld, were not easily 
persuaded by the ideals of  the Nazi Party. Dur-
ing Operation Barbarossa, Hans Herwath von 
Bittenfeld was a junior officer in the Wehrmacht. 
He classified the genocide in Russia as a “stupid” 
and “inhuman treatment of  the population.”21 
These accounts show that the junior officer 
corps of  the Wehrmacht did not possess the 
ruthless hatred of  Russian and Jews to aggres-
sively pursue acts of  genocide in Russia. 
After breaking the non-aggression pact 
with Russia, Nazi leadership began to force the 
subhuman image of  the Serbs and Russians on 
the German people and the lower ranks of  the 
Wehrmacht through the use of  propaganda that 
displayed the need “to wipe out the species of  
subhuman Red.”22 Wette recognizes that the 
Nazis based this propaganda “less on knowl-
edge” and more on “negative stereotyping and 
prejudice.”23 Nazi leaders used this stereotyping 
to try and eliminate any inhibitions German sol-
diers would have had towards killing Serbs, Poles, 
or Russians.24 As expected, the Nazis perpetuated 
stereotypes they instilled in the Wehrmacht and 
the German people before the war were tested 
when the war began. As Wehrmacht soldiers be-
gan to come into contact with Eastern European 
soldiers and citizens, the conceptions of  Russian 
soldiers began to change. Marlis Steinert explains 
in her book Hitler’s War and the Germans that 
“the daily contact with the eastern worker, who 
showed himself  to be intelligent, technically tal-
ented, and likeable caused the real breach in this 
carefully created image of  the enemy.”25 Steinert 
recognizes that the common German and the 
lower levels of  the Wehrmacht identified with 
the common Eastern European and saw him as 
a comrade. This is hardly the attitude that would 
have resulted in the common Wehrmacht soldier 
actively pursuing the execution of  Eastern Eu-
ropeans. The close contact between Wehrmacht 
soldiers and Eastern Europeans alleviated the 
artificial hatred planted by the Nazi leadership in 
the Wehrmacht ranks. 
With experience in battle, many Wehrmacht 
soldiers even began to admire the courage of  
the Russian soldiers. In a 1942 letter Helmut von 
Harnack noted, “the extreme modesty of  the 
personal needs of  the Russian soldier, who in his 
on the how brutally the Wehrmacht conducted 
the war in the east when he wrote, “all evidence 
of  humanity appears to have disappeared in deed 
and in heart and in consciousness.”29 
Other Wehrmacht soldiers understood and 
commented on the brutality of  their actions. 
One private in the Wehrmacht believed that 
“none will remain unpunished by this war, each 
will get his just desert, in the homeland as at the 
front.”30 Other soldiers saw the destruction of  
German cities as the punishment for the crimes 
of  the Wehrmacht. Johannes Huebner stated 
it plainly when he said, “Death is the wages of  
sin.”31 These views of  admiration of  Russian 
soldiers and the remorse for the brutalization of  
Russian civilians were not the cause of  the war 
crimes committed by the Wehrmacht. Junior 
officers and noncommissioned officers of  the 
Wehrmacht did not embrace the sense of  racial 
superiority that the Nazi leadership tried to 
instill in them. 
Unlike the lower levels of  the Wehrmacht, the 
senior officer corps did not show any significant 
and Leeb saw mass sterilization as an acceptable 
alternative to murder.33
The actions of  the Wehrmacht during the 
first years of  World War II can be attributed to 
an overzealous senior officer corps that em-
braced the racial aspects of  the war in Eastern 
Europe. These officers were willing to step over 
the limitations placed on them by Nazi leader-
ship because of  their strong ideological con-
nections to the views of  the Nazi Party. Wette 
attributes the strong connection between the 
Wehrmacht officer corps and Nazi leadership 
to the shared importance of  war to the state. 
Nazi leadership was ready and willing to engage 
in warfare to ensure the survival of  a strong 
German state. Senior Wehrmacht officers shared 
this view of  the importance of  warfare. Field 
Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief  of  Staff  
of  the Prussian army from 1858 to1888, believed 
that “Peace is a dream, and not even a good one; 
war is a link in God’s world order.”34 Moltke 
represents a strong tradition of  war amongst the 
German people that praised the German warrior 
in his passionate struggle to expand Germany’s 
boarders. General Hans von Seeckt made a 
connection between the importance of  war and 
the inferiority of  Eastern Europeans when he 
said that Jews and Communists didn’t share the 
same views with the ethnic Germans on the 
importance of  war.35 This agreement in ideology 
was part of  a larger movement within the Third 
Reich that resulted in the submission of  Weh-
rmacht generals to the will of  Hitler and high 
Nazi leadership. Wette recognizes the political 
power and autonomy of  the Wehrmacht gener-
als, but he says that they saw political pluralism as 
a weakness in government: “The military leaders 
rejected democracy because they regarded it as a 
weak form of  government, and they welcomed 
the reestablishment of  an authoritarian state 
under Hitler.”36 This submission to the will and 
ideology of  Nazi authority is what caused the 
leadership of  the Wehrmacht to take matters into 
their own hands on the front. 
The cases of  brutality and murder com-
mitted by the Wehrmacht were the result of  
decisions made by the Wehrmacht senior officer 
corps. The Wehrmacht was not supposed to 
act as execution squads in the campaign against 
Russia, yet Major Hans Georg Schmidt von 
Altenstadt saw things differently. He not only 
ordered the execution of  a group of  Jewish 
refugees sequestered in Kamenz-Podolsk, but 
also the entire local Jewish population. He did 
this without receiving direct orders to execute ei-
ther group.37 One of  the photographs from the 
execution of  alleged Russian political partisans 
in Minsk even depicts the final acts of  preparing 
the prisoners to be hanged being carried out by 
Wehrmacht officers.38 Wehrmacht officers com-
mitted these acts partially because they “wanted 
to show their ‘Fueher’ just what model national 
socialists they were.”39 
In September, 1941 General Max von 
Schenkendorff, Commander of  the Rear Area 
Army Group Center, ran a training program 
for company level officers on how to conduct 
warfare against the Russian partisans. The 
training program taught Wehrmacht company 
officers that “the Jew is the partisan, the partisan 
is the Jew.”40 This view is part of  an older set of  
propaganda messages used in the mid-1930s to 
portray Soviets and Jews as threats to the world, 
which subsequently caused senior officers like 
Schenkendorff  to pursue the active persecution 
of  Jewish citizens. Wehrmacht generals may have 
been able to maintain an ethnic view of  the war 
because they were not in constant contact with 
common Eastern Europeans. Lower-level Weh-
rmacht soldiers were able to see the true nature 
of  the Eastern Europeans and make connections 
with them while the senior officer corps of  the 
Wehrmacht remained distanced from the enemy 
and their own soldiers.
The first-hand involvement of  the Weh-
rmacht in the murder of  Eastern Europeans 
during the campaigns against Russia and Poland 
is undeniable. The photographic evidence of  
Wehrmacht war crimes confirms the active 
participation of  the Wehrmacht in an ethnic war 
that many thought only the S.S. Einsatzgrup-
pen were responsible for. Other accounts of  
Wehrmacht soldiers and officers have indicated 
the existence of  a complex relationship between 
Wehrmacht personnel and their conception of  
Eastern Europeans. Noncommissioned officers 
and junior officers who were in constant contact 
with Eastern Europeans were able to draw their 
own conclusions about the people Nazi lead-
ers had labeled as ethnically inferior, while the 
Wehrmacht generals remained rooted in Nazi 
ethnic ideology. The recent conclusions that 
historians have made in the last few decades have 
challenged the popular conceptions of  responsi-
bility for the events in Eastern Europe between 
1939 and 1942. Currently, many people hold the 
common Wehrmacht soldiers responsible for 
these events, and while they certainly deserve 
their share of  the blame, these events were not 
caused by desire of  individual soldiers to murder 
ethnic enemies of  the Third Reich. Instead, the 
execution of  Eastern Europeans was the result 
of  Wehrmacht generals taking matters into their 
own hands and overstepping their bounds. 
Major Hans Georg Schmidt von Altenstadt not only 
ordered the execution of a group of Jewish refu-
gees sequestered in Kamenz-Podolsk, but also the 
entire local Jewish population.  He did this without 
receiving direct orders to execute either group. 
mixture of  doggedness and toughness possesses 
an enormous power of  resistance.”26 After an 
initial admission that Russians were “a people 
that requires long and good schooling in order to 
become human,” a private in the Wehrmacht ad-
mired the “often superhuman, purposeless resis-
tance of  encircled groups” of  Russian soldiers.27 
Members of  the Wehrmacht also felt sympathy 
and regret for the victims of  murder. In a 1941 
letter, Kurt Vogeler said that “at no time in [the 
world’s] existence has there been a war that can 
be compared with this current one . . . The poor, 
unhappy Russian people! Its distress is unspeak-
able and its misery heart-rending.”28 In a letter 
from the same year Heinz Kuechler commented 
signs of  resentment for the actions of  genocide 
in Eastern Europe. In fact, one of  the examples 
that even resembles resentment among the 
general staff  comes from Lithuania after fifteen 
hundred Jews were executed in 1941. Franz von 
Roques, commander of  the Army Group North 
Rear Area, and Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb 
contemplated sterilizing the remaining Eastern 
European Jews instead of  committing mass mur-
der. 32 This event suggests that Wehrmacht of-
ficers were aware of  the killings and had enough 
influence to prevent them from occurring. It 
also shows that any sort of  resentment found 
among the Wehrmacht officer corps could not 
prevent ethnic violence completely since Roques 
Figure 3
“It Comes From underground and In Between” by Samantha Rivera
